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v. Close, 83 Ohio St. 339, 94 N.E. 746 (1911); party walls, Yarra v.
Lynch, 226 Mass. 153, 115 N.E. 238 (1916).
Where agencies and appliances are retained in control of the lessor
there is an implied obligation to keep them in a reasonably safe condition,
Lewin v. Pauli, i9 Pa. Super. 447 (1902); Starr v. Sperry, 184
Iowa 540, 167 N.W. 531 (1918); Hirsch et al v. Radt, 228 N. Y.
100, 128 N.E. 653 (1920); a qualified possession and general super-
vision is such control as to render the lessor liable, Marr v. Dieter, 27
Ga. App. 71I (1921); Cossgrove v. /ltlantic Coast Line R. R. Co.,
3o Ga. App. 462 (1923); and where a heating plant, sewer system,
or lighting apparatus is installed for the common use and benefit of
tenants there is a duty to use ordinary care and such apparatus will be
deemed under the lessor's control, Hager v. Cleveland Trust Co., 29
Ohio App. 32 (1928) ; Devine v. Ficklin, 192 Ill. App. 592 (1915) ;
Queeny v. Willi, 225 N. Y. 374, 122 N.E. 198 (1919); Wardman
v. Hanlon, 280 Fed. 988 (1922).
Most of the cases dealing with heating apparatus involve liability for
not supplying sufficient heat. In this case the injury was caused by ex-
cessive heat. Since it was entirely within the control of the tenant as
to who should enter the room where the pipe was located, the argument
for holding the landlord on the basis of control is somewhat weakened.
Imposition of liability on the ground of control by the landlord extends
his liability beyond the preceding cases. But since the heating system
was entirely within the control of the lessor the extension seems reason-
able. JACK G. DAY
MORTGAGES
DOWER IN PURCHASE MONEY MORTGAGE
One J. T. Hutchinson purchased real estate, paying part cash and
giving a mortgage for the balance. The cash payment was borrowed
from a trust company and secured by a mortgage on the same property.
Three years later the mortgage given to the vendor was paid. There-
after a new loan of $15,120 was made by the trust company, $13,440
of which was used to pay off the balance due on the original loan.
Hutchinson died in 1929 and the trust company as executor sold the
estate for $22,500. The widow of the deceased claims that dower
should be based on the $22,500, whereas the executor claims it is pay-
able out of $9,060, this being the difference between $22,5oo and the
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$13,440. The court held for the executor. (Facts taken from record).
Memorandum opinion of Hutchinson v. Evans, 130 Ohio St. 553, 220
N.E. 643, Ohio Bar, March 23, 1936.
A mortgage given to secure a loan from a third party advanced for
the purchase of land is a purchase money mortgage. Jarvis v. Hannen,
40 Ohio St. 334 (1883); Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Barnes Con-
struction Co., 147 Ga. 677, 95 S.E. 244 (I918); Western Tie and
Timber Co. v. Campbell, 113 Ark. 570, 169 S.W. 253, Ann. Cas.
1916 C. 943 (914). The question before the court was whether the
widow was dowable out of the surplus only or out of the entire proceeds.
The answer depends upon the interpretation of section 86o6 G.C.,
which has since been superseded by section 10502-1 G.C. The husband
died in 1929 and section 10502-1 G.C. became effective in 1932, and
therefore does not affect the decision in this case. The repealed section
read as follows: "A widow or widower who has not relinquished or
been barred of it, shall be endowed of an estate for life in one-third of
all the real property of which the deceased consort was seized as an
estate of inheritance at any time during the marriage . . . . " (Italics
writer's).
The courts have consistently held, that a purchase money mortgage
has priority over dower. The husband's interest is not of a sufficient
character so as to be an estate of inheritance, and therefore the wife is
not entitled to dower as against the mortgage. Stow v. Tifft, 15 Johns.
458, 8 Am. Dec. 266 (1818); Jones v. Davis et al., 121 Ala. 348. 25
So. 789 (1898); Frederick v. Emig 186 Ill. 319, 57 N.E. 883, 79
Am. St. Rep. 283 (19oo). This is true whether or not the wife joined
in the purchase money mortgage. Fox v. Pratt, 27 Ohio St. 512
(1875); Butler et al. v. Thornburg, 131 Ind. 237, 30 N.E. 1073
(1891).
One theory underlying these cases is that of instantaneous seizin.
This is to the effect that the seizin of the husband attaches for so brief
an instant that no estate in dower can attach. Stow v. Tifft, supra;
Hicks v. Fletcher, 147 Ark. 14, 226 S.W. 524 (1921); Western Tie
and Timber Co. v. Campbell, supra. See note, Ann. Cas. 1916 C 946.
A contrary theory has been advanced in a few of those jurisdictions
that adopt the title theory of mortgages. See Stow v. Tift, supra (dis-
senting opinion); Potts v. Meyers, 14 U.C. Q.B. 499 (1877); Lynch
v. O'Hara, 6 U.C.C.P. 259 (1877). In lien theory states, of which
Ohio is one at least until default by the mortgagor, it might be argued
that the doctrine of transitory seizin is inapplicable since the mortgagor
retains title Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd Ed. Vol. III, p. 2564. How-
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ever, in spite of this, in at least two decisions Ohio has followed the
transitory seizin theory. Fox v. Pratt, sura, Nichols v. French, 83
Ohio St. 162, 93 N.E. 897 (i9io). But in a third case, resort was
had to a different theory, to the effect that the person furnishing the
property used as security has a claim superior in equity to that of the
debtor or his spouse. Hickey v. Conine, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. (N.S.)
321 (1904), affirmed without opinion in 71 Ohio St. 548, 74 N.E.
1137 (904). The courtin the case of InreHays, Idi Fed. 674, 679
(19xo), in reviewing the Ohio cases on this point, said that the case is
inconsistent with the Ohio view, and that the Supreme Court must
have found facts to distinguish the case from the other Ohio cases, or it
would have been overruled. In accord with Hickey case; Boorum v.
Tucker, 51 N.J. Eq. 135, 26 Atl. 456 (893), see note, 52 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 552. Even though, in most jurisdictions, the wife's dower is
subject to the mortgagee's rights, she still has a dower in the equity of
redemption. Mills v. Van Voorhies, 2o N. Y. 412 (1859).
In the principal case the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County. The latter in another case
with similar facts had previously held that dower was to be allowed
only out of the surplus remaining after the payment of the mortgage.
George, ildmr. v. George, 51 Ohio App. 169, 4 Ohio Op. 260, 20
Abs. 148, Ohio Bar, Feb. 17, 1936. The court was of the opinion
that the husband was at no time seized of the land in an unincumbered
condition. Because of this affirmance, and the fact that George v.
George, supra, had a similar fact set-up, it is reasonable to believe that
the theory of the latter case was used in the principal case. Furthermore
the memorandum opinion cited Fox v. Pratt, supra, and Nichols v.
French, supra, in both of which the theory of instantaneous seizin was
advanced. Therefore the Court in the principal case correctly held, that
since the husband was at no time seized of an estate of inheritance in
that portion of the real estate represented by the $13,44o, the wife was
dowable in the surplus only.
The court further held that the mortgage for $15,120 was a sub-
stitute for the prior mortgage to the extent of $13,44o. This holding
prevented the attachment of dower to the unincumbered fee. A pur-
chase money mortgage does not lose its priority by the subsequent taking
of another mortgage, and in the absence of any evidence of an intention
to extinguish a prior mortgage, it remains in full force and effect.
J. R. Wilkes v. R. M. Miller, .dmr., 156 N.C. 428, 72 S.E. 482
(1911); Byers et al. v. Chase et al., lo2 Nebr. 386, 167 N.W. 405
(1918); Justin v. Underwood, 37 Ill. 438, 87 Am. Dec. 254
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(1865); Hassell v. Hassell, et al., 129 Ala. 326, 29 So. 695 (1899);
White v. Stevenson, 144 Cal. 104, 77 Pac. 828 (904). Therefore,
unless the intention of the parties is otherwise, when a mortgage is
discharged and a new one taken as part of a single transaction, the
seizin between the release and the subsequent mortgage is but momen-
tary and right of dower cannot attach. Crisman v. Lanterman, 149
Cal. 647, 87 Pac. 89, 117 Am. St. 167 (i9o6); Westchester Fire
Ins. Co. v. Norfolk Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 14 Fed. (2) 524 (1926).
In the case at bar the prior mortgage was cancelled of record. Gener-
ally this is not conclusive of discharge. 44 Ohio App. 18o, 184 N.E.
765, 14 Abs. 65 (1932). Contra, where surrendered to the mortgagor.
J. R. Wilkes v. R. M. Miller, Admr., supra.
In accord with the great weight of authority the Supreme Court
was entirely justified in holding that the widow was dowable in the
surplus only. The question of whether the second mortgage was a sub-
stitute for the original could have easily been decided either way
because of the fact that the intention of the parties is such a controlling
factor. SAm TOPOLOSKY.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
COUNTY CHARTER VESTING MUNICIPAL POWER IN THE
COUNTY
The Constitutional amendment of November, 1933, Article X,
was intended to give counties a privilege of home rule similar to that
already enjoyed by municipalities. (See County Home Rule in Ohio,
by Harvey Walker, I Ohio St. L. J. II, 1935). It provides for the
election of a charter commission to prepare a charter for submission to
the electors of the county. The simplest form of charter which can be
adopted is one which does not vest any municipal power in the county.
Such a charter to become effective requires only a simple majority vote
of the electors voting thereon in the county. But a charter vesting any
municipal power in the county must also have the approval of the
majority of electors voting thereon in the largest municipality, in the
county outside of such municipality, and in each of a majority of the
combined total of municipalities and townships in the county.
The charter submitted to the electors of Cuyahoga County was
intended to be of the first class, and a majority of those voting thereon
in the county approved it. The members of the Board of Elections
